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protection, in effect, as if the mortgagor never sold the property
to the third party. If the mortgage is unrecorded, the rights of
the mortgagee against the mortgagor are still the same as if the
mortgage was recorded, but the mortgagee has no right of seizure
against the third party; the third party is liable, however, if he
has no affidavit. This personal liability can, in some cases, im-
pose a very harsh penalty on the third party. For example, if
the property involved were an automobile that had been wrecked
since the original purchase, the third party might be held for
possibly a $2000 debt because he purchased a car for $900 with-
out getting the affidavit.
Under the present law the Harris case was certainly cor-
rectly decided. It would seem, however, that the statute which
is. the basis for the decision does not achieve its purpose by
imposing personal liability on third parties who fail to obtain the
affidavit. Also the penalty for this failure seems to be harsher
than it need be. This purpose of the statute might be achieved
as effectively by having a statute which would merely make




Defendant sold bottled gas in a defective container and an
explosion resulting from this defective condition injured the
plaintiff's unborn child, which was in the eighth month of gesta-
tion. The child was born dead and action was brought under
Nebraska's wrongful death statute.' That act provides that where
the decedent could have maintained an action for injuries had
death not ensued, the wrongful death action permits recovery by
the appropriate members of the family or next of kin.2 The
Supreme Court of Nebraska denied recovery, adhering to the
majority common law rule that for actions in tort for personal
injuries, an unborn child is not recognized as a separate being.
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Company, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (Neb. 1951).
1. Neb. Rev. Stat. 30:809 (1943).
2. The act is based on the English wrongful death statute, Lord Camp-
bell's Act. Practically every state has adopted similar acts and it follows
that there is no reason to segregate physical injury actions from wrongful
death actions in treating the problem.
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Both the common law and the law of civilian jurisdictions
recognize the unborn child as in esse for purposes of receiving
certain civil rights.3 Until recent years, however, common law
courts have refused to recognize a cause of action for the child
for injuries incurred prenatally.4
Civil law jurisdictions are somewhat at variance in approach-
ing the problem. Although French law, like the common law,
has shown unwillingness to recognize the rights of the unborn
child in tort,5 the courts of Quebec and California have adopted
a more liberal view.6
The Louisiana law on prenatal injuries is also unsettled. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana has never had occasion to pass on a
tort action in the name of a child prenatally injured;7 however,
our courts of appeal have dealt with the problem. In Cooper v.
Blanck8 in 1923 a mother in the ninth month of pregnancy was
struck by falling plaster from the ceiling of defendant's house.
A premature birth followed and the child lived only a few days.
3. For example, the common law recognizes the child's right to, take a
legacy (Page, Wills, § 216 [2 ed. 1926]) and rights of inheritance (id. at § 896).
Civil law recognizes the right to receive gifts and the right to successions
(French law, see 1 Planiol, Droit Civil §§ 10-11 [1952]; Louisiana law, see
Arts. 954, 1482, La. Civil Code of 1870).
The unborn child has been recognized as in esse in the law of crimes.
For example, if an unborn child is maliciously injured and is born alive and
dies, the crime may be murder. See Clark v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671, 67
Am. St. Rep. 157 (1898). K:*
4. For a thorough discussion of the common law on prenatal injuries,
see White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LouisIANA LAW
RHvEw 383 (1952).
5. 1 Planiol, loc. cit. supra note 3. See also Winfield, The Unborn Child,
8 Camb. L.J. 76, 87 (1942).
6. Art. 608, Quebec Civil Code, provides that persons are considered to be
civilly in existence at the instant of conception if they are later born alive.
Articles 771 and 838, respectively, provide that an unborn child may receive
a gift inter vivos and may take a benefit under a will. The Supreme Court
of Canada, on the basis of these articles concluded that a child en ventre sa
mere is a separate being and applied this conclusion to actions in tort for
physical injuries. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, Can. S.C. 456, 4 D.L.R. 337
(1933).
The California Civil Code in Article 29 provides that a child conceived
but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person so far as may be neces-
sary for protection of its interests in the event of a subsequent birth. In the
case of Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939), a Cali-
fornia court of appeals held that this provision included compensation for
personal injuries sustained by the negligent use of surgical instruments dur-
ing delivery. Both the Quebec and the California cases involved a viable child
and the courts gave attention to the fact but did not expressly ground their
decisions on it.
7. It did rule in a converse situation that a posthumous child had a
cause of action for injuries to its father who could not complete the suit
because of his death. Badie v. Columbia Brewing Co., 142 La. 853, 77 So. 768
(1918).
8. 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
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The suit was under Article 2315 of the Civil Code which pro-
vides that parents have a right of action for the wrongful deaths
of their children. The court discussed the codal articles that
imply that a child en ventre sa mere is a living person 9 and held
that parents may sue for the wrongful death of a child even if
the injury causing death was prenatal. Speaking of injuries
received during the viable stages of gestation, Justice Westerfield
said, ".... if the child be killed at this period, before its birth, we
see no reason why its parents cannot maintain an action for the
death of the child."
It would appear from the Cooper decision that the rules are
clearly set out. However, complications were confronted within
a short time. In Youman v. McConnell' in 1927 a mother in the
seventh month of pregnancy was negligently injured; two months
later the child was stillborn. The defense urged application of
Article 28 which provides that children born dead are considered
as if they had never been born or conceived. The court applied
the article literally and refused damages for the wrongful death.1
In future cases the Louisiana courts might hold that a child
conceived is a separate being and that any injury, whether it be
to an embryo or to a foetus' 2 would be grounds for recovery by
the child. This position could be justified by Article 29 of the
Civil Code which provides that children in the mother's womb are
considered, in whatever relates to themselves, as if they were
already born. In all probability, an action in which it is alleged
that the injury was received by an embryo would not be enter-
tained, the reason being -the difficulty of proving the cause of
such injury. The courts might, as a second possibility, recognize
Blackstone's theory that a child is a person after it has once
9. See note 3, supra.
10. 7 La. App. 315 (1927).
11. The inconsistency of such a situation is quite apparent. In the only
other Louisiana case involving prenatal injuries, Heins v. Guzman, Orleans
No. 9484 (La. App. 1924), twin children were injured; subsequently, one was
born alive and died after a few hours and the other was stillborn. Damages
were allowed for the suffering and death of the child who had lived, but
after the district court trial, plaintiffs abandoned any attempt to recover in
the name of the child who was stillborn. The probable reason was Article
28. It is manifest that this article was not directed at such a situation; the
problem could be remedied.
Notice that Article 29 of the California Civil Code (see note 6, supra) is
qualified by the words "in the event of a subsequent birth." The Quebec code
has a similar provision. If that provision is strictly applied, courts of Cali-
fornia and Quebec face the same problem presented in Louisiana by Article
28 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
12. The organism is considered an embryo for approximately the first
three months of gestation after which it is known as a foetus.
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moved in the womb of its mother-the "quick" child.' 3 A third
possibility for Louisiana courts is the adoption of the theory
propounded by Justice Boggs, dissenting in Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, that a foetus is a separate entity after it reaches that
stage of gestation at which it could live without its mother.14
There is language in the Cooper case which could justify either
an acceptance or a rejection of the doctrine. The court said, "...
we content ourselves with the observation that the civil law is
still the basis of our jurisprudence." 15 Those words imply that
it was adhering to the general civil law principle that an unborn
child is considered an individual for matters which may be to
its advantage. However, in writing for the majority, Justice
Westerfield further said that the court was concerned in that case
with a foetus advanced to the final stages of gestation when all
authorities, medical and legal, agree that the foetus is viable.
This clearly implied that it was adopting the theory of the Boggs
dissent. The latter appears to be the more enlightened view and
the most adaptable to tort actions.
Harold J. Brouillette
13. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, 129-139 (4 ed., Cooley, 1899).
14. The reasoning of the dissent was that while it is correct to consider
a foetus in its early stages as a part of the mother, it is contrary to medical
science to consider a "viable" child as such. Relative to having a cause of
action for personal injury, the dissent said, "If at that period (when the
child is viable) a child so advanced is injured in its limbs or members and
Is born into the living world suffering from the effects of the injury, is it not
sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not
to the child but wholly to the mother?"
Although the hypothesis of the Boggs dissent is a more enlightened
aproach to the problem, it does not eliminate all of the difficulties. In
Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E. 2d 446 (1939), the defendant
physician diagnosed pregnancy as a tumor and gave x-ray treatments for
four months before realizing his mistake. These treatments were given
before the viable stage of pregnancy, yet the evidence was quite conclusive
that the rays were the cause of the child's being crippled and feeble-minded.
An acceptance of the viable theory would not have changed the decision
denying recovery to the child.
15. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352, 358 (La. App. 1923).
